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Abstract
In recent years, logistics finance as a new concept 
appeared in people’s line of sight, and the related logistics 
financial business has brought considerable profit for each 
enterprise, at the same time it also brought unprecedented 
credit risk challenge. Whether it can effectively control 
of these risks is a key factor of the logistics financial 
business development smoothly. This paper start from 
three main body which conclude bank, the third party 
logistics enterprises and financing enterprises, analysis 
of the relationship between the three parties from the 
perspective of game theory and financing enterprises 
to choose the probability of the normal production and 
bank supervision probability. From the perspective of 
game equilibrium, the risks of various game situations are 
analyzed in order to provide an effective strategy for the 
development of logistics financial business.
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INTRODUCTION
In China, logistics finance is a new term that only appeared 
in recent years. About the concept of logistics finance, 
there have some different statement of the academia. 
This paper argues that the logistics finance is facing the 
whole process of logistics operation in a broad sense, 
application of a variety of financial products, achieve the 
effective integration of logistics, capital flow, business 
flow and information flow, organization and regulation 
the currency movement in the process of supply chain 
operation, so as to improve the operational efficiency of 
funds in a series of activities. In a narrow sense, it is the 
settlement and financing service provided by the logistics 
provider in the process of logistics business, which often 
requires the participation of bank. As a kind of new 
business, logistics finance business involves three main 
bodies of the bank, third party logistics enterprise and 
the financing enterprise, involving a wide area, but each 
subject has its own position and interest requirements, 
so the corresponding risk also presents a complex and 
changeable characteristics. Therefore, how to effectively 
avoid risks has become the key to the smooth development 
of the logistics financial business, but also the focus of 
attention of all parties concerned.
Dong, Zhang, Wu, Li, and Zhou (2011) start from 
the three aspects of the bank, logistics enterprises and 
financing enterprises, analysis of the game between them, 
and discuss the game in the profit impact factor and the 
corresponding risk. Based on the present situation and 
problems of logistics finance (Liu, 2015) put forward 
the development trend of logistics finance in the future. 
Shearer and Diamond (1999) pointed out that with the 
change of market environment and market structure, 
especially in the logistics business and financial services 
integration under the new environment, enterprises 
are faced with the risk of changes in the financing 
need to use more scientific and reasonable methods of 
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quantitative analysis based on the specific situation. Tang 
and Qiao (2006) using game analysis method from the 
point of view of risk control demonstrates to the small 
and medium-sized enterprise to carry out feasibility of 
logistics finance, and points out that the corresponding 
risk can be through the use of standardized management 
system and new management tools. Yang (2010) 
analysis and recognize of the existing credit risk in the 
logistics financial business, analysis of the principal-
agent relationship between logistics finance main body 
of the third party, using the game theory to measure the 
analysis of the logistics finance credit, mainly including 
the probability of corporate financing fraud in logistics 
financial specific business and the probability of collusion 
financing enterprises and logistics enterprises, analyzing 
the influencing factors of financing corporate defaults. Xu 
(2006) proposed to carry out the logistics financial services 
to the real demands of the third party logistics enterprises, 
finance companies and financial institutions, analysis the 
function and significance of the implementation of the 
logistics financial business, through the game analysis of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and then put forward 
the relevant development of logistics financial practice 
strategy. In inventory financing, asymmetric information 
between banks and the third party logistics enterprises 
may incur moral risks, often causing economic losses 
of banks, it is found that the pure incentive model is not 
applicable to practical conditions, (Sun, Chu, & Wu, 
2014) given in this paper offer theoretical instruction 
and a practical method for effective regulation of banks 
from example analysis. Based on the benefit of small and 
medium-sized enterprise, logistics enterprises and bank 
from logistics finance, (Wen & Dong, 2008) proposed 
the risk due to lack of fiduciary duty, inefficient data to 
choose in favor of its own strategies. 
1.  LOGISTICS FINANCIAL BUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
In recent years, logistics financial business has developing 
at a fast speed in China, which has become the financial 
institutions, logistics enterprises and financing enterprises 
to improve the core competitiveness of a hotly contested 
spot. But the logistics finance in China starts late, the 
development is not enough comprehensive, so there also 
has some problem, mainly concludes the following several 
points:
(a) Although the logistics financial business in China 
has developed for nearly ten years, but compared with 
foreign countries, there still have a big gap. In China, 
non financial institutions shall not engage in financial 
activities, so Chinese third party logistics enterprises 
cannot be as UPS as the acquisition or investment of a 
bank specialized in financial business operations, they 
must choose to cooperate with bank. Therefore, bank is 
the only one credit subject in the third party of logistics 
financial business, but bank lack of the real situation of 
financial enterprises and logistics enterprises, so the risk 
of the overall business of the logistics finance to control 
capacity is insufficient.
(b) As a new business, logistics finance has brought 
unprecedented risk; therefore, the current biggest problem 
is lack of a sound risk control system. Because of the 
information asymmetry between the bank, the logistics 
enterprise and the financing enterprise, that is, there is 
a certain gap between the bank’s understanding of the 
financing enterprise and the real situation of the financing 
enterprise. So, for the bank, the risk of ex-assessment, 
in the matter of control and post processing is still a big 
problem.
(c) Recently, although the rapid development of the 
logistics industry, but the improvement of relevant laws 
and regulations have not kept pace with the development 
of the logistics industry, therefore, the lack of industry 
regulation is also a major problem in the development of 
logistics financial business.
2.  GAME ANALYSIS ON THE THREE 
PARTY OF LOGISTICS FINANCE
This paper chooses the warehouse receipt pledge mode as 
the example to analysis the relationship between bank a, 
logistics enterprise b and financing enterprise c.
2.1  Basic Assumptions
1) Financing enterprise loans from bank, time is one 
year, agreed in a year to repay the principle A and interest 
R. And during the period of the loan, stored goods 
as collateral in the warehouse of logistics enterprise 
designated by bank, assuming the collateral value is S.
2) Bank supervision cost of logistics enterprise is C1, 
supervision cost of financing enterprise is C2. Logistics 
enterprises on mortgage financing company the value of 
the goods cost evaluation is K1, stored in the inventory 
management cost is K2, assessment costs and inventory 
management costs are paid by the financing enterprise.
3) Financing business loans for the normal production 
of the probability is p1, revenue is R1, use the loans for 
investment project with high risk probability is 1-p1, 
revenue is R2. The probability of success of investment 
project with high risk is p2, the probability of failure of 
investment is 1-p2, when investment failure enterprise 
revenue was 0 and loss all loans. Bank supervision 
strategies for adopting probability is p3, adopting 
probability of no supervision is 1-p3.
4) Collusion in the logistics enterprise and the 
financing enterprise costs are C3 and C4, obtain illegal 
interests are F1 and F2, in the financing of the logistics 
business enterprise and collusion does not occur 
evaluation cost and inventory cost.
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5) Cooperation between banks and logistics enterprises 
is based on the integrity, so this paper assumes that when 
the logistics enterprises and banks choose to cooperate, 
the bank adopts non supervision strategy to the logistics 
enterprise.
6) When bank adopts supervision strategy to the 
financing enterprise, it can monitor the flow of capital 
financing enterprise, to understand whether the financing 
enterprise has investment high risk projects. In this case, 
the bank can force the financing business to choose 
normal production, otherwise cancel the contract.
2.2  Model Building
1) Logistics companies do not cooperate with the financing 
business, nor with the banks, banks do not need to take a 
supervisory strategy. Game tree as shown in Figure 1.
Bank 
Not Supervision Not Supervision 
Not Cooperate
Financing Enterprise Logistics Enterprise 
InvestmentProduction
Figure 1
Game Tree
This model is the most ideal mode; it is a win-win 
situation. Financing enterprise choose normal production 
to obtain the production of income, repayment of bank 
loans and interest pay the cost of logistics enterprise 
inventory management costs. Bank get interest income, 
logistics enterprise obtains assessment and inventory 
management benefits.
zoccasion, each subject can get the expected benefits; 
the only risk is the risk of the production and operation of 
financing enterprises.
2) Logistics enterprises choose to cooperate with the 
bank, and the cooperation between them is based on the 
integrity of the foundation, not with the financing of 
enterprises to cooperate. In this case, the bank adopts non 
supervision strategy to the logistics enterprise, the game 
tree as shown in Figure 2.
211 KKRRRc −−−=
RRa =
21 KKRb +=
Cooperate
Logistics Enterprise Bank 
Supervision Not Supervision Not Cooperate 
Production Investment
Logistics Enterprise Financing Enterprise
Production
Financing Enterprise 
Investment
Figure 2
Game Tree
① Bank adopts supervision strategy to the financing 
enterprise; financing enterprise can only choose normal 
production. The same with the first case, only banks pay 
more cost for financing enterprises of supervising C2.
21 KKRb +=
211 KKRRRc −−−=
In this occasion, only banks pay a cost of supervision 
on enterprise financing, bank operating condition and the 
information system of perfect degree directly affects the 
size of the supervision cost, so this risk is information risk 
and financing enterprises operating risks.
② Bank adopts non supervision strategy to the finance 
enterprise.
a. Financing enterprise choose the normal production, 
this situation is the same as the first case.
2CRRa −=
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In this occasion, although there have the same 
income with the first kind of the most ideal situation, 
the risk is indeed different. Because when banks choose 
non supervision strategy, financing enterprise choose 
according to the contract to production probability is 
determined in corporate finance credit status, so at this 
time the risk is the credit risk which is the biggest risk in 
logistics financial business.
b. Financing enterprise choose to invest in high-risk 
projects and success.
RRa =
21 KKRb +=
212 KKRRRc −−−=
In this occasion, financing enterprise choose to invest 
in high-risk projects, which exist probability of success, 
and at this time the financing enterprise does not in 
accordance with the contract to choose normal production. 
So this risk is the risk of credit risk and investment of 
financing enterprise.
c. Financing companies choose to invest in high-
risk projects, but investment failure. At this time the 
proceeds of the financing business is 0 and loss all loans. 
The bank can only be realized as a pledge to stop losses. 
For logistics enterprise, collateral value assessment is 
RRa =
21 KKRb +=
211 KKRRRc −−−=
in the early period of the implementation, so this part 
is the revenue of the logistics enterprise, and inventory 
management costs is in the end, so this part of is the loss 
of logistics enterprise. Financing enterprise loss the value 
of original mortgage and the assessment of the cost to 
logistics enterprise.
ASRa −=
21 KKRb −=
1KSRc −−=
In this occasion, the financing enterprises choose to 
invest in high-risk projects, but failure, showing that 
there exist credit risk and operational risk of financial 
enterprise. Banks rely on cash pledge to stop losses, 
the collateral value of the property is the key factors 
affecting the income of the bank, so the logistics 
enterprises confront charge level of assessment of the 
accuracy and level of inventory management has a 
direct impact on bank earnings and confrontation charge 
level of the assessment of the accuracy and logistics 
enterprise inventory management level which belongs to 
the technical risk. So at this time the risk is credit risk, 
operation risk and technical risk.
3) Logistics enterprise choose to cooperate with 
financing enterprise to cheat bank loans, and gets illegal 
gains.
① Bank take the supervision strategy to logistics 
enterprise and financing enterprise, financing enterprises 
can only choose normal production. At this time the game 
tree as shown in Figure 3.
Bank 
Supervision Supervision 
Cooperate
Financing Enterprise Logistics Enterprise 
InvestmentProduction
Figure 3
Game Tree
In this occasion, the bank needs to pay more 
supervision costs, and the level of bank supervision costs 
affect the income of the bank, so the risk is the risk of 
information and business risk.
② Bank take the non supervision strategy to logistics 
enterprise and financing enterprise, at this time, the logistics 
enterprise and financing enterprise pay the cost of collusion 
are C3 and C4, obtain illegal income respectively F1 and F2, 
and at this time does not occur assessment costs and inventory 
management costs, the game tree as shown in Figure 4.
21 CCRRa −−=
21 KKRb +=
211 KKRRRc −−−=
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Bank 
Not Supervision Not Supervision 
Cooperate
Financing Enterprise Logistics Enterprise 
InvestmentProduction
Figure 4
Game Tree
a. Financing enterprise choose the normal production.
RRa =
31 CFRb −=
421 CRFRRc −−+=
In this occasion, bank do not take the supervision 
strategy, logistics enterprise and financial enterprise 
choose to cooperate, then there is the credit risk, and 
financing enterprise choose the normal production, so the 
risk is the management risk of the financing enterprise.
b. Financing enterprise choose to invest in high-risk 
projects and success.
RRa =
31 CFRb −=
422 CRFRRc −−+=
In this occasion, facing the credit risk of financing 
enterprises, and there is uncertainty with the probability of 
success of high risk investment projects, at this time the 
risk is investment failure business risk.
c. Financing enterprise choose to invest in high-risk 
projects but failure. Because logistics enterprises and 
financing business choose to cooperate, so there is no 
collateral, and the bank’s loss is the total amount of loans.
ARa −=
31 CFRb −=
42 CFRc −=
CONCLUSION
According to the above game analysis, we can get the 
following two points:
(1) The financing enterprise choose the normal 
production or high risk investment project earnings are 
1
cR and
2
cR .
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )RCFRppKKRRppKKRRppRc −−+−+−−−−+−−−= 4213121131211311 1122
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )RCFRppKKRRppKKRRppRc −−+−+−−−−+−−−= 4213121131211311 1122
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )RCFRppKKRRppKKRRppRc −−+−+−−−−+−−−= 4213121131211311 1122
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]122122312 111 KSpKKRRpppRc −−−+−−−−−=
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]122122312 111 KSpKKRRpppRc −−−+−−−−−=
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]422422231 111 CFpCRFRppp −−+−−+−−+
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]422422231 111 CFpCRFRppp −−+−−+−−+
(2) The choice of bank supervision and not supervision 
earnings are 2aR  and 
2
aR .
( ) ( )21312311 CCRppCRppRa −−+−=
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ASpRpppRppRa −−+−−+−= 2231312 11113
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ASpRpppRppRa −−+−−+−= 2231312 11113
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ApRppp −−+−− 2231 111
From the above two points, we can get the game 
equilibrium income of financing enterprise and bank.
21
cc RR =
21
aa RR =
Among them, in 2cR , p2(R2-R-K1-K2)+(1-p2)(-S-K1) 
and p2(R2+F2-R-C4)+(1-p2)(F2-C4); in 2aR , p2R+(1-p2)
(S-A) and p2R +(1-p2)(-A) are the expected return of 
financing enterprises to choose high risk projects under 
different circumstances. In this paper due to the many 
variables involved in the complicated calculation, so that 
the expected return of the enterprise financing investment 
in high-risk projects were E1, E2, … , E4.
By the above simplified,
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( )( )
( ) ( )( )421213211
213
1 12
1
CRFREEpKKRR
EEpp
−−+++−+−−−
+−
=
improve the inventory management capabilities; reduce 
inventory costs, so that even in the case of financing 
enterprises default can also guarantee their own interests. And 
for the main risk sources of financing enterprises, still should 
choose to normal business activities, as the opportunity cost 
of commercial fraud caused is unpredictable.
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(3) Result analysis
It is not difficult to see from the above results p1 and p3 
is proportional, when the probability of bank supervision 
is bigger; the probability of financing enterprise to select 
the normal production is greater. From the analysis of 
the results, In order to reduce the risk of loans, bank can 
increase the punishment, reduce the risk of collusion. 
Actively cooperate with logistics enterprises to reduce 
the information asymmetry in the loan activities, so as 
to improve the probability of financing enterprises to 
select the normal production. The higher the probability 
of success of the investment risk project, the greater the 
possibility of financing companies choose to invest in 
high-risk projects, the probability of selection of normal 
production is smaller, So p1 and p2 inversely, so p2 and 
p3 is inversely proportional too, that is, the greater the 
probability of success of the investment risk project, 
the lower the probability of the normal production of 
financing companies choose to produce, the greater the 
probability of the bank’s choice of supervision. In this 
case, the bank should actively improve their business 
level, grasp the market trends, understand the financial 
market investment tendency, and reduce the probability of 
enterprises to choose high risk projects.
Through the above analysis of the three party logistics 
financial business, the main body of the game is determined 
in different cases, the main income, which provides a basis 
for the development of logistics finance business. Each 
subject can be determined by analyzing the interests of 
different situations. For banks, we should always strengthen 
supervision, to guard against the emergence of conspiracy 
to fraud on the market. For logistics enterprises, we should 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )43111
4311
3 135
13
EEpCRp
EEpRpp
+−+−
+−+
=
